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around the prototypical end location associated with using objects. However, most studies
supporting the hierarchical view have used well-known actions and objects that are highly
over-learned. Accordingly, at present it is unclear if the hierarchical principle applies to
learning the use of novel objects as well. In the present study we found that when learning
to use a novel object subjects acquired an action representation of the end location asso-
ciated with using the object, as evidenced by slower responses in an action observation
task, when the object was presented at an incorrect end location. By showing the impor-
tance of knowledge about end locations when learning to use a novel object, the present
study suggests that end locations are a fundamental organizing feature of the human
motor system.
 2011 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Imagine yourself wandering around in a museum of modern art, in which all types of different colored objects are placed
at tables. A sign on the wall encourages you to grasp the objects to ﬁnd out what happens. When you grasp the ﬁrst object,
you notice that a tiny melody comes out of the object and you move the object closer to your ear. Your movement towards
the next object elicits a breeze of rose smell and you move the object towards your nose to ﬁnd out whether it is the object
that produces the odor. As the example nicely illustrates, the end location to which objects are directed plays an important
role in understanding what the object can be used for. For example, we put headphones in our ears to listen to music or we
grasp a comb to straighten our hair before dinner.
Developmental studies suggest that the ability to grasp and to play with objects precedes infant’s knowledge about what
an object can be used for (Barrett, Davis, & Needham, 2007). Within the ﬁrst year of life infants gradually learn how to grasp
and manipulate objects according to their physical properties (Bourgeois, Khawar, Neal, & Lockman, 2005), but it is only dur-
ing the second year of life that children develop the ability to effectively grasp and use objects in a meaningful fashion (e.g.
grasping a spoon to eat; McCarty, Clifton, & Collard, 1999). For example, when presented with a spoon with the handle ori-
ented to the left or the right, 9-month old infants always grasped the spoon with their dominant hand, irrespective of the
object’s orientation, ending up with an odd grip when approaching the mouth. In contrast, older infants anticipated the de-
sired end location (i.e. bringing the spoon to the mouth) and adjusted their manner of grasping the spoon depending on the
object’s orientation.. All rights reserved.
ognitive Neuroscience, Brain Mind Institute, École Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Station 19, AI
1770.
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of the more general principle that the way in which people approach and grasp objects is largely determined by their con-
secutive use. Studies in the domain of motor control show for instance that during grasping movements people automati-
cally select the handgrip in a way that they will end the movement in a comfortable end-position, which is known as the
end-state comfort effect (Rosenbaum, Vaughan, Barnes, & Jorgensen, 1992). These ﬁndings are in line with the view that
our motor system is organized in a hierarchical fashion and that the speciﬁc grip that is used for grasping an object is se-
lected in accordance with a speciﬁc end location (Grafton & Hamilton, 2007; Majdandzic et al., 2007; van Schie & Bekkering,
2007). In support of this view, it has been found that neurons in the inferior parietal lobe of the monkey respond differently if
the same grasping action is part of an action sequence directed towards the mouth (e.g. grasping to eat) or towards the table
(e.g. grasping to place), suggesting that different movement elements are linked to their ﬁnal end location (Fogassi et al.,
2005). In addition, it has been found that the processing of goal- and grip-related information during action planning calls
upon different brain networks (Majdandzic et al., 2007; van Schie & Bekkering, 2007). Furthermore, recent studies suggest
that conceptual knowledge about objects may be organized in a hierarchical fashion as well around the prototypical end
location associated with objects (Lindemann, Stenneken, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2006; van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering,
2008b). That is, because we have a lot of experience bringing objects to speciﬁc end locations (e.g. we typically move a
cup towards our mouth in order to drink) strong associations exist between an object and the object’s associated end loca-
tion (e.g. cup-mouth).
However, most studies discussed thus far involved actions and objects that were highly familiar and over-learned. Accord-
ingly, at present it is unclear if the dominance of end locations over grips in our interaction with objects reﬂects a general fea-
ture of the human motor system, or is limited to well-known or familiar actions. The aim of the present study was to
investigate if the dominance of end locations over grips applies to the acquisition of novel action representations concerning
the object’s use as well. To investigate this question we employed an object training paradigm. Subjects ﬁrst trained to use
novel objects in a speciﬁc fashion. In the ﬁrst experiment subjects learned to use objects that elicited a speciﬁc action effect
(i.e. producing a sound or odor when brought towards the ear or nose) and in the second experiment subjects trained with
objects without an action effect. The rationale for using objects that elicited an action effect in the ﬁrst experiment was to
mimic naturalistic object use as close as possible. That is, in daily life most of our actions do not consist of the arbitrary move-
ment of objects towards end locations, but the movements have a speciﬁc function (e.g. grasping a headphone to bring it to-
wards the ear serves the function of hearing). To replicate the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst experiment and to examine the
importance of object function for learning end locations, in a second experiment subjects practiced with objects that did
not elicit an action effect.
After subjects trained with the novel objects, an object recognition task was administered, in which subjects were ﬁrst
presented with a photograph of a trained or untrained object, which was followed by an action snapshot. The picture of
the single object served as an implicit cue for the retrieval of action information associated with that object (e.g. the object
is brought towards the ear). Previous studies have indicated that action information about objects is automatically activated
when objects are perceived (e.g. Bub, Masson, & Cree, 2008) and that an important aspect of this knowledge consists of the
object’s prototypical end locations (van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2009).
The object picture was followed by an action snapshot, in which subjects observed an actor performing an action
with the object that was correct or incorrect with respect to how subjects were trained to use the objects. Subjects were
instructed to decide if the objects that were presented in the two subsequent pictures (single object and the action snap-
shot) involved the same object or different objects (two-choice response task). A comparable action observation para-
digm has been used successfully to assess the functional organization of conceptual knowledge about well-known
objects (van Elk, van Schie, & Bekkering, 2008a). By manipulating the correctness of the action context in which an ob-
ject was presented, a stronger interference of end location–violations (e.g. cup presented near ear) than of grip-violations
(e.g. cup presented with odd grip) was found, suggesting that conceptual knowledge for understanding other’s actions is
organized primarily around end locations. In a similar fashion, in the present study the end location and the grip that
the actor applied to the objects were independently manipulated. Although the action–object relation was only implicit
and irrelevant to the subjects’ task (same/different decision), a facilitation in object identiﬁcation was expected if the
observed action was appropriate for the object. Trials with incorrect or incompatible actions, on the other hand, were
expected to delay object identiﬁcation, and to result in slower reaction times. As a consequence, any effect of the action
correctness on reaction times could be regarded as an implicit effect of activated action representations on the process-
ing of observed actions.2. Experiment 1
2.1. Methods
In the ﬁrst experiment subjects performed goal directed actions with objects that elicited a sound-effect or an odor-effect
when brought towards the ear or nose respectively. Accordingly, the objects had a clearly deﬁned function that was directly
related to the speciﬁc way in which the object was grasped and moved towards the face. After training, subjects conducted
an object recognition task, deciding whether two subsequent pictures (single object and the action snapshot) represented
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repeatedly being confronted with pictures representing objects being used in an incorrect fashion on acquired object
representations.
2.2. Subjects
In the ﬁrst experiment, 16 right-handed subjects (four males, mean age: 19.1 years) participated. All subjects were stu-
dents at the Radboud University Nijmegen and received course credits or 8 euro’s for participation. Handedness was assessed
through informal verbal inquiry.
2.3. Stimuli
Four novel objects were constructed for which in daily life no speciﬁcally known function exists. The four objects were
divided in two object-sets. Each object-set consisted of one object that could be brought towards the ear (ear-object) and
one object that could be brought towards the nose (nose-object). The ear-object produced a sound-effect when brought to-
wards the ear and the nose-object produced an odor (shampoo smell). As a sound-effect a bell sound of 2000 ms duration
was used. The volume was adjusted for each individual subject to ensure that the sound effect was heard when the object
was brought towards the ear. For the nose-object informal verbal enquiry conﬁrmed that participants smelled the object
when brought towards the nose. One of the ear objects could be grasped with a pronated powergrip in order to move the
object subsequently towards the ear (see Fig. 1 upper panel). The other ear object could be grasped with a supinated pow-
ergrip to move it towards the ear (see Fig. 1 lower panel). One of the ear objects could be grasped at the handle, with the
thumb opposite to the ﬁngers and this object had to be inverted in order to bring it towards the nose. The other ear object
could be grasped at the handle with a supinated precision grip in order to move it towards the nose. Subjects always trained
only with one object-set (target objects) and did not train with the other objects (no-go objects). The training of different
object-sets was counterbalanced between participants.
For each object four different action pictures were taken, in which the correctness of the end location and the grip applied
to an object were independently manipulated with respect to the way in which subjects trained to use that object. Accord-
ingly, objects could be categorized with respect to their designated use as: (1) correct end location, correct grip (e.g. ear ob-
ject directed towards ear and grasped in a proper way), (2) correct end location, incorrect grip (e.g. ear object directed
towards ear and grasped in incorrect way), (3) incorrect end location, correct grip (e.g. ear object directed towards nose,
but grasped in a proper way), or (4) incorrect end location, incorrect grip (e.g. ear object directed towards nose, and grasped
in an incorrect way). In addition, a single picture was taken of each object to be used as a task cue in the training phase (de-
scribed below) and as an implicit recall cue in the test phase.Fig. 1. Experimental procedure during training blocks. If a picture on the screen represented a target-object (upper panel), subjects responded by releasing
the starting button, grasping the object and bringing the object to the end location (ear or nose). The next trial was initiated when the subject returned to
the starting button. If the picture on the screen was a no-go object (lower panel), no subsequent action was required and subjects held their hand at the
starting button until the next trial was presented.
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Subjects were seated comfortably in front of a table on which a computer display, four novel objects and a response-de-
vice were placed (see Fig. 1). Pictures were presented on a 19’ computer display at a resolution of 1024  768 pixels. At a
viewing distance of 80 cm this resulted in pictures with a visual angle of approximately 13 and the size of the objects in
the picture closely resembled real object size. The training phase, in which each participant acquired action experience with
two out of four novel objects, was divided in three training blocks, alternated with three test blocks, in which participants
performed a visual object recognition task. During training blocks movement kinematics of the right thumb and index ﬁnger
were recorded, using the MiniBird-motion tracking system (miniBIRD 800, Ascension Technology Corporation). Spherical
areas of 5 cm around each object and 10 cm around the ear and the nose were deﬁned in order to control task performance
online and to present a sound-effect if the ear object was transported towards the ear. Error messages were presented, if a
wrong object was grasped and if an object was brought to a wrong end location. The experiment was controlled using Pre-
sentation 11.0.03 (neurobehavioral systems, Albany, CA).
2.5. Training phase
Before the experiment started, subjects were instructed how to grasp the two target-objects in a proper way and how to
bring the objects to their designated end location. During each training block, subjects trained to use the objects in the des-
ignated way. In order to be able to directly compare performance in visual object recognition for trained and untrained ob-
jects, in the training phase participant had to perform speciﬁc actions with two out of four novel objects (target objects),
whereas no action was required for the remaining two novel objects (no-go objects) on the onset of a visual cue. The assign-
ment of objects to go- and no-go sets was randomized between participants, thereby counterbalancing object-speciﬁc inﬂu-
ences on visual object recognition on the level of the group. The timeline for a single training trial is represented in Fig. 1. A
ﬁxation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed by a picture of a single object. The subject’s task was to perform the appro-
priate action with the object if it was a target-object and to withhold from responding if it was a no-go object. If the depicted
object was a target-object, subjects released the starting button, grasped the target-object in the appropriate way, brought
the target-object to the designated end location and put the object back on the table. The next trial was initiated when the
subject returned to the starting button. If the depicted object was a no-go object no response was required and the next trial
was initiated after 2–3 s. During the training block, each object was presented 12 times, resulting in 12 actions with each of
the target-objects (12 times action towards the nose; 12 times action towards the ear) and 24 no-go trials, resulting in a total
number of 48 trials per block.
2.6. Test phase
The timeline for a single trial in the test phase is depicted in Fig. 2. Each trial started with a ﬁxation cross for 500 ms,
followed by a picture of a single object for 1000 ms. Next a ﬁxation cross appeared for 1000 ms, followed by a picture rep-
resenting an actor using the object. Subjects were required to respond to the second picture, by indicating whether the objectFig. 2. Experimental procedure during test blocks. Subjects conducted an object recognition task, indicating whether an actor was using the same object as
the single object presented in the ﬁrst picture. If the object in the two subsequent pictures was the same, subjects responded by pressing the left button
(upper part of ﬁgure; target trials) and if a different object was presented in the second picture subjects pressed the right button (lower part of ﬁgure; catch
trials). For each object, four different action pictures were created in which the correctness of the end location and the grip applied to the object were
independently manipulated.
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both pictures were the same, subjects responded by pressing the left button whereas if the objects differed subjects re-
sponded by pressing the right button. In this way we ensured that participants always responded to target trials with the
hand that was unrelated to the object’s use and that the response to target trials was always made with the same hand. Reac-
tion times were measured relative to onset of the second stimulus. In 67% of all trials both pictures represented the same
object (target trials) and in 33% of all trials a different object was presented in the second picture (catch trials). Accordingly,
target trials consisted of two subsequent pictures, the ﬁrst showing an object only and a second showing an object used by
an actor, in which the same object was presented. For each of the four objects, four different pictures composed of the factor-
level combinations for End location (correct, incorrect) and Grip (correct, incorrect) could be presented, which were repeated
six times each, resulting in 96 target trials. Forty-eight catch-trials were included as ﬁller items in which a different object
was presented in the second picture, resulting in a total number of 144 trials during each test block. The ﬁrst eight trials were
used as practice trials in which the subject familiarized with the task. Training and test blocks were presented in an alter-
nating fashion and each block was repeated three times to allow testing for the effects of training over time. Analysis focused
on the test blocks in which eventual effects of training should become apparent in a facilitation of reaction times for obser-
vation of trained objects being used in a correct fashion. Please note that for the analysis of reaction times we only focused on
target trials in which the two subsequent pictures represented the same object. In ﬁller trials a different object was pre-
sented in the second picture and therefore it was not possible to investigate the effects of a previously activated action rep-
resentation on subsequent object recognition. Finally, to control for the possible confound that the effects observed could be
attributed to differences in stimulus salience, we also analyzed reaction times to non-trained objects. Because the trained
object sets were counterbalanced between participants, overall the reaction times to trained and untrained objects were ob-
tained in response to exactly the same pictures. Accordingly, any difference in the reaction time-effects between trained and
untrained objects should be attributable to the training of the subject with two of the four objects. Although the subject did
not know about the correct goal and grip for the untrained objects, we analyzed reaction times to untrained objects using a 2
(End location: correct vs. incorrect)  2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated measures ANOVA, similar to the reaction times
to trained objects.
2.7. Results
2.7.1. Training blocks
During the training blocks subjects grasped the wrong object in less then 1% of all trials. Incorrect end-postures (moving
the object to an incorrect position near the face) were detected in 8.3% of all trials. The incorrect end-postures likely reﬂect
that when subjects grasped the ear-object they tended to slightly tilt their head and accordingly the ear-object was detected
in the area that was previously deﬁned as the nose area. Error messages on the screen encouraged subjects not to move their
head during the transportation phase. Reaction and movement times are represented in Table 1 and differences between
blocks were analyzed using separate t-tests.
For reaction times, a signiﬁcant difference was only found between the ﬁrst block (672 ms) and the third block (634 ms),
t(15) = 2.2, p < .05. For object grasping times, marginally signiﬁcant differences were found between the ﬁrst block (838 ms)
and the second block (700 ms), t(15) = 1.9, p = .07 and between the ﬁrst block (838 ms) and the third block (695 ms),
t(15) = 2.1, p = .057. For end posture times, no signiﬁcant differences were found between blocks (p’s > .16).
2.7.2. Test blocks
Subjects incorrectly responded to action pictures in 4.5% of all trials. No difference was found between errors in response
to action pictures representing trained compared to untrained objects (F < 1). Trials with incorrect responses or trials that
exceeded the subject’s mean reaction time by more than two standard deviations were excluded from subsequent analysis.
Reaction times averaged over test blocks for trained objects are represented in Fig. 3 and were separately analyzed using a
2 (End location: correct vs. incorrect)  2 (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated measures ANOVA Analysis of the reactionTable 1
Reaction times and movement times for the three training blocks in the ﬁrst and second
experiment. Reaction and Movement Times are represented in milliseconds and standard errors
are between brackets.
Block 1 Block 2 Block 3
Experiment 1
Reaction times 672 (22) 652 (20) 634 (22)
Object grasping times 838 (83) 700 (71) 695 (75)
End posture times 1667 (154) 1604 (128) 1431 (84)
Experiment 2
Reaction times 701 (43) 675 (42) 644 (38)
Object grasping times 730 (42) 713 (34) 679 (37)
End posture times 1597 (68) 1628 (98) 1503 (82)
Fig. 3. Reaction times in Experiment 1 for the trained objects for the different stimulus categories. Bars on the left represent pictures in which the trained
object was presented at a correct end location, bars on the right indicate objects at an incorrect end location. Light bars represent objects grasped with a
correct grip and dark bars represent objects being grasped with an incorrect grip. Error bars represent standard errors.
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reaction times to pictures representing a target-object at a correct (667 ms) compared to an incorrect end location
(703 ms). In addition, a main effect of Grip was found, F(1, 15) = 4.8, p < .05, g2 = .24 reﬂecting faster reaction times in re-
sponse to correct grips (677 ms) compared to incorrect grips (693 ms). No interaction was found between End location
and Grip, F(1, 15) = 1.1, p > .30, g2 = .07.
To investigate whether the reaction time data differed between test blocks, Block was included as an additional variable,
using a three (Block: 1st, 2nd and 3rd)  two (End location: correct vs. incorrect)  two (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated
measures ANOVA. In the analysis of the reaction time data, Block did never interact with any of the other variables (F’s < 1)
and accordingly, averaging reaction times over blocks seems warranted. Finally, the analysis of reaction times for untrained
objects did not reveal signiﬁcant main-effects or interaction effects (all F’s < 1). Therefore it is unlikely that the reaction time
effects observed in response to trained objects can be attributed to differences at a perceptual level.
2.8. Discussion
In the ﬁrst experiment subjects trained to use novel objects that elicited an action effect (sound or odor) when used in a
proper fashion. After training, subjects performed an object recognition task in which the correctness of the action (end loca-
tion at which the object was presented and the grip applied to the object) was manipulated. A strong interference with reac-
tion times was found when subjects responded to pictures in which the trained object was held at an incorrect end location
near the face. Furthermore, reaction times were slower when trained objects were grasped with an incorrect grip. Impor-
tantly, reaction time effects cannot be explained on the basis of perceptual differences between the stimulus categories, be-
cause no interference effects were observed for the untrained objects. The present ﬁndings suggest that learning to use a
novel object that elicits a meaningful action effect results in the acquisition of action semantics, representing both the appro-
priate grip and the correct end location of the object. Interestingly, observing an object at an incorrect end location caused a
stronger interference with object identiﬁcation than observing an object being grasped with an incorrect grip. In addition,
reaction time effects of incorrect end locations and grips seemed to be additive, with the strongest interference occurring
when both the end location and the grip applied to the object were incorrect. Thereby the ﬁrst experiment provides support
for the idea that the dominance of end locations over grips is a general principle underlying learning the use of novel objects,
and is not restricted to the use of familiar objects and tools.
A possible functional mechanism underlying the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst experiment could be the ideomotor principle,
according to which actions are represented in terms of the effects they produce (Hommel, 1996; Hommel, Musseler, Ascher-
sleben, & Prinz, 2001; Kunde, Hoffmann, & Zellmann, 2002; Prinz, 1997). On this account, the observation of an object
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tor program required for using the object (Paulus, Hunnius, Vissers, & Bekkering, in press). The activated motor program in
turn facilitates the recognition of objects that are used in a proper fashion (van Elk et al., 2008a). According to this interpre-
tation, the interference effects of incorrect end locations and grips found in the ﬁrst experiment reﬂect the incongruence be-
tween the displayed action and the acquired action representations that were activated by retrieving the action effect in
response to observing the picture of a single object. Following this line of reasoning, an interesting question is how important
the action effect of an object (in this case a sound- or odor-effect) is in facilitating the acquisition of novel action represen-
tations. For example, it could well be that learning to use objects without a clearly deﬁned action effect results in the acqui-
sition of different action representations, in which the relation between the end location and the grip is more arbitrary and
gets less well established. To address this question we conducted a second experiment in which subjects trained with objects
that did not have a clear action effect (no odor or sound was presented when the object was brought towards the nose or
ear).
3. Experiment 2
The same experimental setup and procedure as in the ﬁrst experiment were used. Subjects learned to perform actions
with novel objects and subsequently they performed an object recognition task, in which the correctness of the action con-
text (end location at which the object was presented and grip applied to the object) was manipulated. In contrast to the ﬁrst
experiment, the objects that the subject used did not elicit an action effect. Subjects were trained to always bring one object
towards their nose and one other object always towards their ear. In the second experiment 16 right-handed subjects par-
ticipated (four males, mean age = 23.3 years) who had not participated in the previous experiment.
3.1. Results
3.1.1. Training blocks
During the training blocks subjects grasped the wrong object in less then 1% of all trials. Incorrect end-postures (moving
the object to an incorrect position near the face) were detected in 4.0% of all trials. Reaction and movement times are rep-
resented in Table 1 and differences between blocks were analyzed using separate t-tests.
For reaction times, signiﬁcant differences were found between the ﬁrst block (701 ms) and the second block (675 ms),
t(15) = 2.3, p < .05 and between the ﬁrst block (701 ms) and the third block (644 ms), t(15) = 5.1, p < .001. A marginally sig-
niﬁcant difference was found for reaction times between the second block (675 ms) and the third block (644 ms), t(15) = 2.1,Fig. 4. Reaction times in Experiment 2 for the trained objects for the different stimulus categories. Bars on the left represent pictures in which the trained
object was presented at a correct end location, bars on the right indicate objects at an incorrect end location. Light bars represent objects grasped with a
correct grip and dark bars represent objects being grasped with an incorrect grip. Error bars represent standard errors.
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third block (679 ms), t(15) = 2.0, p = .06 and between the second block (713 ms) and the third block (679 ms) t(15) = 2.0,
p = .06. No signiﬁcant differences were found between blocks in end posture times (p’s > .11). Data from the training blocks
of the second experiment conﬁrms ﬁndings from the ﬁrst study, by showing the largest decrease of reaction times and object
grasping times between the ﬁrst and the third block.
3.1.2. Test blocks
In the second experiment subjects incorrectly responded to action pictures in 8.7% of all trials. Trials with incorrect re-
sponses or trials that exceeded the subject’s mean reaction time by more than two standard deviations were excluded from
subsequent analysis. Reaction times for trained and untrained objects in the second experiment are represented in Fig. 4 and
were analyzed separately using a two (End location: correct vs. incorrect)  two (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated mea-
sures ANOVA.
Analysis of the reaction times to trained objects revealed a signiﬁcant main-effect of End location, F(1, 15) = 11.5, p < .005,
g2 = .43, reﬂecting faster reaction times to pictures representing a trained object at a correct (594 ms) compared to an incor-
rect end location (611 ms). No main-effect of Grip was found and no interaction was found between End location and Grip
(F’s < 1).
To investigate whether the reaction time data differed between test blocks, Block was included as an additional variable,
using a three (Block: 1st, 2nd and 3rd)  two (End location: correct vs. incorrect)  two (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated
measures ANOVA. In the analysis of the reaction time data, Block did never interact with any of the other variables (F’s < 1)
and accordingly, averaging reaction times over blocks seems warranted. To control for the possible confound that reaction
time effects to target objects actually reﬂect differences in saliency between the stimulus categories, we also analyzed reac-
tion times to untrained objects using a two (End location: correct vs. incorrect)  two (Grip: correct vs. incorrect) repeated
measures ANOVA. No main-effect of End location or Grip was found for the untrained objects and no interaction was found
between End location and Grip (p’s > .14).
3.2. Discussion
In the second experiment subjects learned to use novel objects that did not elicit an action effect when brought towards
the nose or ear. In the subsequent object recognition task subjects responded slower to pictures in which a trained object
was presented at an incorrect end location, thereby replicating the ﬁndings from the ﬁrst experiment. In contrast to exper-
iment 1 no main effect of Grip was found. The relevance of the present ﬁndings and theoretical implications will be discussed
in the ﬁnal section.
4. General discussion
The present study investigated whether the dominance of goals over grips, observed in previous studies for the use of
well-known objects, applies to the acquisition of novel action representations as well. Previous studies have shown that ac-
tion knowledge about objects is automatically activated when the object is perceived (Bub et al., 2008) and facilitates the
subsequent recognition of objects (van Elk et al., 2008a). Accordingly we expected that the training with novel objects should
result in the acquisition of action representations, which in turn should facilitate the recognition of objects being used in a
proper fashion.
In the ﬁrst experiment it was found that subjects who learned to use novel objects that elicited an action effect responded
slower to pictures in which the object was used in an incorrect fashion. More precisely, when presented with a picture of the
target-object during the test phase, object identiﬁcation was found delayed when the object was presented at an incorrect
end location or when the object was grasped with an incorrect grip. Interference effects of end location- and grip-violations
during the recognition of objects can be regarded as a mismatch between the acquired action representation of the object
and the displayed action (van Elk et al., 2008a). Therefore, the interference effects of end location- and grip-violations likely
reﬂect that subjects who learned to use a novel object with a clear action effect acquired a strong action representation about
the correct use of an object. In the second experiment we assessed the relative importance of action effects for the acquisi-
tion of novel action representations. In line with the ﬁrst experiment, it was found that after training subjects responded
slower if the object was presented at an incorrect compared to a correct end location. Thereby the second experiment under-
lines the importance of knowledge about end locations for the acquisition of novel action representations, even if the objects
do not have functional signiﬁcance.
Interestingly and in contrast to the ﬁrst experiment, in the second experiment observing the object being grasped with an
incorrect grip did not interfere with object identiﬁcation. It could be that in the ﬁrst experiment the grip applied to the object
was more important, as the object only elicited an action effect, when grasped in an appropriate way. Therefore, the training
with functional objects may have resulted in the acquisition of action semantics, specifying both the end location and the
grip required for grasping the object. Previous studies have used the term ‘action semantics’ to refer to the action represen-
tations that enable us to use objects in a meaningful way (Hodges, Spatt, & Patterson, 1999; Noppeney, 2008; Springer &
Prinz, 2010; van Elk et al., 2008b, 2009; Vingerhoets, Vandekerckhove, Honore, Vandemaele, & Achten, 2010). In these cases,
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motor associations, but is related to the meaningful use of objects. In other words: although at a neural level action knowl-
edge may be correctly described in terms of speciﬁc sensorimotor associations, at a behavioral level such a description does
not capture the fact that these associations are behaviorally meaningful. For instance, we bring cups to our mouths in order
to drink and as a consequence the association between cup and mouth is not arbitrary but reﬂects a behaviorally meaningful
action. Accordingly, with respect to the present study it seems warranted to suggest that in the ﬁrst experiment subjects
acquired novel action semantics, as the learned actions were behaviorally meaningful. In contrast, in the second experiment
the relation between the way in which the object was grasped and the end location was more arbitrary and accordingly grip-
related information was less well established than in the ﬁrst experiment.
At least two possible functional mechanisms could underlie the inﬂuence of action effects on the acquisition of novel
action representations, namely the rationality principle and the acquisition of modality-speciﬁc representations. First, it
could be that by assessing the efﬁciency of an action in achieving a particular action effect people pay special attention
to the correct grip. Several studies have shown that people assess the rationality of the speciﬁc grip chosen to perform an
action with respect to the given end location, which is known as the efﬁciency principle (Csibra & Gergely, 2007). Accord-
ingly, by estimating the efﬁciency of a particular grip in relation to the object’s function subjects may incorporate the speciﬁc
grip information into their representation of the object.
Secondly, it could be that the functional signiﬁcance of an object (i.e. the object can be used for hearing or smelling)
resulted in a deeper processing of the object properties through additional modality-speciﬁc representations, which are
represented in a distributed neural architecture (Allport, 1985; Martin, 2007). In the language domain classical studies
concerning the learning of words have shown that the processing of meaningful information facilitates the retrieval of this
information (Craik & Lockhart, 1972; Craik & Tulving, 1975). Although speculative, one intriguing possibility is that training
with objects that elicit an action effect equips the object with functional signiﬁcance and results in a richer semantic
representation, including both auditory and olfactory features (cf. Allport, 1985; Martin, 2007). These modality-speciﬁc
representations may in turn facilitate the retrieval of action representations during object recognition (cf. Siakaluk, Pexman,
Aguilera, Owen, & Sears, 2008). Although at present the precise neural mechanisms underlying the acquisition of novel
action representations remain unclear this suggestion opens interesting possibilities for future research.
An intriguing question is how crucial motor experience is for the acquisition of novel action representations. Although the
present study did not directly address this issue, it must be pointed out that subjects did not show the same advantage for
correct compared to incorrect end locations for untrained objects that were only perceptually presented during the training
phase. Furthermore, in a recent study the importance of motor experience for the acquisition of novel object knowledge was
directly demonstrated (Paulus, Lindemann, & Bekkering, 2009). When subjects performed a concurrent motor task during
the learning of novel object-end location associations, no subsequent advantage was observed when objects were presented
at a correct compared to an incorrect end location. Finally, several studies indicate that only the active but not the passive
use of a tool results in the tool being incorporated in the body schema, thereby further underlining the central importance of
action experience for novel tool use (Maravita & Iriki, 2004; Maravita, Spence, Kennett, & Driver, 2002).
At a perceptual level, the present study shows that previous action experience with an object facilitates object recogni-
tion, when the object is presented at the expected end location. Related to this issue, a recurring discussion regarding the
hierarchical organization of the motor system concerns the question whether at a perceptual level the dominance of end
locations over grips does not merely reﬂect an advantage of global over local visual processing. Information about the
end location is spatially deﬁned, whereas grip-related information is more locally deﬁned. Thus, information regarding
the grip can only been inferred after attention has been directed to the relevant end location. In addition, visual information
regarding the grip may be more difﬁcult to perceptually discern and remember than information about the end location.
Although we acknowledge that the dominance of end locations over grips can be described at different levels, we would like
to point out that an attentional or memory explanation cannot fully account for the ﬁndings in this and other studies. First, in
the present study participants were primed with a picture of a single object and accordingly were able to retrieve informa-
tion about both the end location and the grip applied to the object, well before the presentation of the action snapshot.
Second, even though the grip applied to the object was made perceptually more salient (e.g. applying different colors to
different graspable parts of the object), still information about the end location had a stronger effect on performance than
grip-related information. Finally, in a recent study on action planning, using a simple reach and grasp task, a similar
dominance of end locations over grips was observed as in the present study (van Schie, van Elk, Bekkering, in preparation.),
thereby providing further support for the notion that the dominance of goal- or end locations over grips reﬂects a fundamen-
tal principle of the human motor system, rather than a by-product of attentional processing.
A related issue when it comes to the hierarchical view of the motor system is whether the observed dominance of end
locations over grips truly reﬂects a hierarchical relation or is a mere necessity following from the temporal relation between
grips and end locations during action planning and execution. By deﬁnition end locations and grips are reciprocally related:
once an end location is selected the required grip is automatically determined and vice versa: once the grip is selected the
possible range of end locations is restricted. This reciprocity between end locations and grips was exploited in a recent study
on action planning (van Schie et al., in preparation). In this experiment we employed a simple reach- and grasp-paradigm,
whereby the end location and the grip of the movement concurred (e.g. movement towards the left object always entailed a
power grip; movement towards the right object always entailed a precision grip). Participants were instructed to perform
the movement either based on grip-related information (power vs. precision grip) or on information about the end location
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probably because the grip required for grasping the object could be determined on the ﬂy. In contrast, planning actions based
on information about the grip was slower, because this entailed an additional selection process (i.e. determining which ob-
ject should be grasped). This experiment shows a more efﬁcient process of action planning if the grip is determined by the
end location than if end location is determined by the grip. Typically, in our everyday actions the grip is indeed determined
by the end location (i.e. grasping a wine bottle to place it in a wine cooler requires a different grip than grasping a wine bottle
to pour a glass of wine). Whether this relationship is described as a ‘natural dependency’ or a ‘hierarchical relationship’ is a
matter of theoretical debate, but at least it shows that the default mode of action planning is the case where end locations
determine the selection of grips.
Previous studies on the acquisition of novel object semantics have typically investigated how at a perceptual level the
categorization of novel objects is facilitated by perceptual features of the objects (e.g. Desmarais, Dixon, & Roy, 2007; Vuong
& Tarr, 2006) or by expertise visual training with the objects (Behrmann, Marotta, Gauthier, Tarr, & McKeeff, 2005; Tarr &
Cheng, 2003). However, relatively little is known about the effects of direct action experience on object recognition. Inter-
estingly, one recent study suggests that pairing novel objects with speciﬁc actions (e.g. pull, slide or twist) may facilitate the
ease with which these objects can be identiﬁed (Desmarais et al., 2007). This effect is likely mediated by the acquisition of
motor representations that become associated with the object and that in turn facilitate object recognition. Preliminary evi-
dence for the involvement of motor representations in the acquisition of novel objects was found in a study by Kiefer, Sim,
Liebich, Hauk, and Tanaka (2007). In the training phase subjects made either a pointing movement towards a new 2D object
or made an action pantomime regarding a detail feature of the object that afforded a speciﬁc action (e.g. pantomime grasping
the object at the handle). After several weeks of training subjects conducted a categorization task while their EEG was re-
corded. Interestingly, an early activation in frontal motor regions and a later activation in occipito-parietal visual-motor
areas was found for subjects in the pantomime compared to the pointing condition, suggesting that the pantomime training
established visuo-motor representations regarding the object’s use whereas simple pointing did not. Further evidence for the
role of visuo-motor representations in the acquisition of novel functional object representations was found in a recent study
in which subjects verbally acquired functional knowledge about novel objects (Paulus et al., 2009). Only when subjects
performed a concurrent motor task during the training phase, but not when performing another attention demanding task,
subjects performed worse on the subsequent recognition of an actor using objects in the correct fashion. Together these
studies suggest that learning to use novel objects relies on the acquisition of motor representations reﬂecting the end
location related to the object’s typical use.
5. Conclusion
The aim of the present study was to investigate if the dominance of end locations over grips, previously observed for ac-
tions with well-known objects, applies to the learning of novel actions as well. It was found that after training with novel
objects, subjects acquired an action representation specifying the end location towards which the objects were directed.
Thereby the present study suggests that the hierarchical view of the motor system reﬂects a general principle, underlying
the learning of novel object use as well.
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